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5Chapter
Education and Labor Market 
Outcomes in Urban West Africa
Mathias Kuépié, Christophe J. Nordman, and François Roubaud
Education in Sub-Saharan Africa is oft en seen as the main policy instrument in 
the fi ght against poverty. In practice, however, although education is an intrinsic 
component of development and well-being, its economic value is not clear, as 
urban unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa is rising, especially among edu-
cated workers. 
Th e mismatch between (increasing) investment in schooling on the one 
hand and actual labor market opportunities on the other represents a major 
challenge for policy makers. For years, the existence of signifi cant rents in the 
formal sector (especially in the dominant public sector) were so high that it 
made sense for individuals to “queue” and to undervalue returns in the informal 
sector. Today, education no longer seems to guard against poverty and social 
exclusion. It is therefore critical to reappraise the external effi  ciency of invest-
ment in schooling in these countries.
Traditional studies of the external effi  ciency of education systems look at the 
impact of education on individuals aft er they leave school.1 Th ey examine two 
types of impacts, economic and social, which can be interpreted either from 
the individual or the collective standpoint. Th is chapter focuses solely on the 
economic and private dimensions of the effi  ciency of education. 
Th e analysis of private returns to education is based on standard human 
capital theory, according to which earnings diff erentials between individu-
als result from diff erences in wage compensation for diff erent human capital 
endowments. Th is theory suggests that investment in education is an explana-
tory factor in the distribution of individual earnings. 
Th is principle has substantial implications for low-income countries, because 
it explains the existence of earnings diff erences between individuals in the labor 
market. From a policy viewpoint, if returns to education are high for individuals 
from poor households, poverty reduction policies designed to promote equal 
opportunities in access to schooling would be appropriate. 
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Numerous objections and criticisms have been made regarding the assump-
tion that education—and hence productivity—is the main determinant of dif-
ferences in individuals’ earnings. Many authors have shown that traditional 
theories postulating the leveling of income levels by individuals with identical 
levels of human capital do not describe reality when markets are imperfect or 
segmented. 
Markets in African countries are imperfect, and the nature of work contracts 
interferes signifi cantly in the relationship between human capital endowments 
and earnings. Th ere are four types of labor markets in developing countries: 
rural, public, private formal, and informal. Each type of market has its own char-
acteristics, such as job seasonality and uncertainty about the level of demand, 
the nature of contracts, and the structure of wages and earnings. However, many 
studies on the link between education and labor market outcomes in Africa 
overlook the fact that the existence of diff erent employment segments, espe-
cially in the rural and informal sectors, may have major implications regarding 
the role of education in labor market integration.2 
Th is chapter analyzes the eff ects of education on remuneration in seven cities 
in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).3 Using Phase 1 
of the 1-2-3 surveys in these capitals, we broaden the scope and refi ne the 
indicators generally used to assess the effi  ciency of education for labor market 
integration in Sub-Saharan Africa, using the same method for each city.4 In 
particular, we estimate the determinants of earnings, especially the eff ect of 
education. Th e data allow us to compare the returns to vocational versus general 
education at diff erent levels of the schooling path, shedding light on the debate 
over whether general education or vocational training yields higher returns. 
Th e household survey data enable us to account for two persistent economet-
ric problems: the possible sample selectivity biases introduced by endogenous 
sector choices and the possible endogeneity of the education variable in the 
earnings function. 
Th e results show that returns to schooling generally increase once an endog-
enous education variable is accounted for. Th is eff ect is particularly strong in 
the informal sector. In most cities in the sample, the returns to education are 
highest in the public sector, followed by the formal private sector and then the 
informal sector. We also shed light on the fi nding that returns to education are 
convex in all cities and sectors, including the informal sector. We provide evi-
dence of signifi cant eff ects of education on individual earnings in the informal 
sectors of the major WAEMU cities, even at high levels of schooling.
Th e chapter is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section describes the econo-
metric models. Th e second section analyzes and discusses the fi ndings. Th e 
last section presents the conclusions and off ers some policy recommendations.5 
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Econometric Methods
Our methodological approach consists of estimating diff erent models to evalu-
ate the impact of education (years of education, type of education [general ver-
sus vocational], level reached, and qualifi cations obtained) on earnings. Th e 
surveys enable us to estimate Mincer-type earnings models, taking account of 
the sample selection eff ects associated with individuals’ participation and sec-
tor choices. In addition, the data allow us to address the possible endogeneity 
of the education variable in the earnings function using alternative techniques 
that make use of information on family background. 
Earnings Equations with Selection Bias Correction
Let Sj be the sectoral situation (j = 0–3), where S0 = no work, S1 = public sector, 
S2 = formal private sector, and S3 = informal private sector. We can view Sj as a 
“response function” to a set of latent continuous variables S*j that measure the 
propensities to have the sectoral situations Sj:
 S*ij = bj’ Xi + eij  (5.1)
and 
 Yij = zj’ Zi + hij, (5.2)
where S*ij measures the propensities of individual i to have the sectoral situation 
Sj; Yij denotes the income individual i earns by working in sector j, where j = 1 
(public sector), 2 (formal sector), and 3 (informal sector); Xi and Zi are vectors 
of observable individual characteristics (including education); bj and zj are vec-
tors of parameters to be estimated; and ejj and hij are error terms. Th e aim is to 
estimate the coeffi  cients zj for each sector. Yj is observed only if sector j is chosen; 
hj and ej are therefore not independent. As a result, the ordinary least squares 
estimator is potentially biased. 
In the fi rst stage, multinomial logit models are used to compute the correc-
tion terms lij from the predicted probability of individual i working in sector j. 
Th e generalized forms of the inverse Mills ratios are then introduced into the 
earnings equation for each sector j, yielding consistent estimators of bj. Lee’s 
method has been criticized because it relies on a strong assumption regarding 
the joint distribution of error terms of the equations of interest (see Vijver-
berg 1993; Dahl 2002; Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand 2007). However, 
the alternative methods we tried (Dubin and McFadden 1984; Dahl 2002) did 
not appear more effi  cient given the small size of the sectoral subsamples.6 We 
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therefore chose Lee’s correction method, which has the advantage of providing 
an easier interpretation of the correction terms.
Another potential problem is that the multinomial logit may suff er from the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, which in most cases 
is questionable. Th e Hausman-type tests performed for each city and sector pro-
vide overwhelming evidence that the IIA assumption was not violated, except 
in the informal sector in Bamako.7 
In both Heckman’s and Lee’s procedure, identifi cation is achieved using 
exclusion restrictions (that is, by the inclusion of additional regressors in the 
fi rst-stage selection equations). In order to preserve comparability across coun-
tries as much as possible, we rely on the same exclusion restrictions for each city. 
However, aft er considering tests of appropriateness of the exclusion restrictions, 
we relaxed such constraints at the sector level (that is, we use diff erent sets of 
identifying variables for selection into the informal sector and the formal sec-
tors [public and private]).8 In the formal sectors, we use six dummy variables 
describing the individual’s relationship to the household head (child, spouse), 
together with the household’s inverse dependency ratio (the number of working 
individuals divided by the total number of people in the household). For the 
informal sector, we excluded only the dependency ratio from the second-step 
regressions, where the individual’s situation in the household oft en appeared 
signifi cant. We tested the appropriateness of this identifi cation strategy using 
Wald tests of joint signifi cance of the identifying variables in the fi rst stage and 
insignifi cance in the second stage for each sector in all cities (21 cases). Th e tests 
highlighted the appropriateness of this choice in 19 cases.9 However, bearing 
i n mind the methodological controversies surrounding the choice of identify-
ing variables in general, we report summary results from uncorrected earnings 
functions (ordinary least squares) as well, which makes it easier to compare our 
results with the results of other studies. 
Endogenous Education
It is widely recognized in the literature that using ordinary least squares to 
estimate the returns to education from cross-sectional data is potentially 
problematic. Th e standard concern is that education may be an endogenous 
variable—that is, correlated with the residual of the earnings function because 
of unobserved individual heterogeneity. To address this issue, researchers com-
monly use instrumental variables techniques, which involve fi nding variables 
that are uncorrelated with the individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity but cor-
related with their education. Th e instrumentation is oft en based on household 
and demographic characteristics that are assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
error term of the earnings equation. Th ese instruments, which are popular in 
analyses of developing country data, may capture various genetic and environ-
mental infl uences (Sahn and Alderman 1988).10 
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We tackle the issue of endogeneity using various techniques. First, we use 
father’s schooling and main occupation as instruments and adopt a control 
function approach (Garen 1984; Wooldridge 2005; Söderbom and others 2006). 
Th is method is adopted when the earnings-education profi le is nonlinear in the 
estimated parameters. As our results show, the marginal eff ects of education are 
nonconstant (for details and discussion of the implementation of this method, 
see Kuépié, Nordman, and Roubaud 2009). 
Following Blackburn and Neumark (1995), Lam and Schoeni (1993), and 
Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997), we also use family background informa-
tion diff erently, introducing it directly into the earnings functions. Doing so is 
another way of applying the control function procedure (see Kuépié, Nordman, 
and Roubaud 2009). 
All of these techniques are interesting, because the diff erent hypotheses 
behind them may lead to common features in the results that can be considered 
relatively robust. Th us, even if endogeneity issues are not perfectly corrected, 
the similarity of results from the diff erent methods should help convince read-
ers of their soundness. 
Impact of Education on Labor Market Outcomes
Th is section examines the eff ect of education on labor market insertion and inter-
individual earnings diff erentials. In the fi rst subsection, we present some fi gures 
on the link between labor market integration (unemployment, sector choice) 
and education. In the second subsection, we report results from pooled and 
sectoral earnings functions and examine summary results obtained with diff er-
ent econometric methodologies, considering in particular selectivity- corrected 
earnings functions and the education variable as an endogenous regressor. In 
the third subsection, we focus on the cross-country comparison, using a set of 
estimates deemed most reliable for each city and sector. In the last subsection, we 
provide an overview of the marginal returns to diff erent qualifi cations. 
Education, Unemployment, and Labor Market Insertion
Th e subsection presents fi ndings on the effi  ciency of education in terms of 
exits from unemployment and integration into diff erent labor market segments 
(formal versus informal). For the seven cities, the unemployment rate is lowest 
(15 percent) among people with the least education. It rises to 20–21 percent 
for people with levels ranging from completed primary schooling to completed 
secondary schooling.11 It drops slightly (to 19 percent) for people who com-
pleted at least one year of higher education. 
Th e fact that human capital is thin on the ground does not appear to protect 
people who have it against unemployment. Th is is particularly true in Lomé, 
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where unemployment increases strictly with the level of education (from 8 percent 
among people with no education to 23 percent among people with higher educa-
tion). Th e trends are less linear in other cities. In most cases, unemployment tends 
fi rst to increase with the level of education, before decreasing with completion 
of secondary school and entry into higher education. Th is pattern is particularly 
strong in Cotonou, Dakar, and Ouagadougou, where higher education somewhat 
reduces the extent of unemployment.
Findings from a logit of the probability of being unemployed (controlling 
for individual and household characteristics such as age, gender, migrant sta-
tus, marital status, household per capita income, the individual’s relationship 
to the head of household, and the household’s dependency ratio) are similar to 
the fi ndings of the descriptive analysis.12 All else equal, individuals with little 
or no education appear to be less exposed to unemployment than individu-
als who have at least completed primary school, probably indicating lower job 
aspirations. Lomé shows a strong positive relation between unemployment and 
education. Abidjan and Cotonou also follow this trend. In the other cities, the 
link between unemployment and the level of education takes the bell shape 
observed previously. 
Th e fact that investment in human capital does not always open the door to 
employment refl ects deterioration of African urban labor markets, the result of 
the failure (or absence) of urbanization policies to set in motion a drive to cre-
ate skilled jobs. It is also a consequence of structural adjustment policies that 
reduced staff  in the civil service. Evidence of the eff ect of these policies is found 
in the fact that among people 45–59, who entered the labor market before the 
urban boom and the full force of the structural adjustment plans was felt, higher 
education is associated with a low risk of unemployment in all seven cities.
Although being unemployed is an indicator of exclusion from the labor mar-
ket, having a job does not always guard against precariousness (see chapters 1, 2, 
and 4). In the following subsections, we look at the link between education and 
the quality of the job held in addition to its impact on unemployment. 
A quantitative analysis of the balance in the labor markets reveals the exis-
tence of signifi cant unemployment against which human capital accumulation 
is no shield, especially among young people. An analysis of external effi  ciency 
should consider the correspondence between the level of education and job 
quality. Job quality is studied here in terms of the employment sector: public 
formal, private formal, and informal (for another approach, see chapter 2).
Th ere is a very close link between the level of education and the employ-
ment sector. For the sample as a whole, 91 percent of employed workers who 
did not start or complete primary school work in the informal sector. Com-
pleted primary schooling brings the proportion in the informal sector down to 
75 percent; completed middle school reduces it to 50 percent. Only 19 percent of 
people who entered higher education work in the informal sector. Th is pattern 
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holds for all cities except Lomé. In Lomé, the formal sector clearly supplants the 
informal sector as the level of education rises, but the correlation is weaker than 
in the other cities and a signifi cant proportion of people with higher education 
(39 percent) work in the informal sector (95 percent of people who did not start 
or complete primary school work in the informal sector). 
We decompose the formal sector into public and private formal sectors and 
then run a multinomial logit model to measure the net infl uence of education 
on sector allocation (table 5.1).13 Th e results show that for all cities and school 
grades, an additional year of education tends to yield the maximum impact 
for integrating the public sector, followed by the private formal sector. In three 
cities (Bamako, Lomé, and Ouagadougou), additional years of higher educa-
tion (more than 13 years of schooling) have no infl uence on the probability of 
integrating into the formal private sector. Th is result may refl ect the incapacity 
of formal private fi rms to create highly qualifi ed jobs for people with higher 
education.
Th e type of education also plays an important role in providing access to the 
formal sector. Only 37 percent of individuals who complete at least four years 
of vocational education—aft er which they receive an occupational profi ciency 
certifi cate (the Certifi cat d’aptitude professionnelle [CAP])—work in the informal 
sector, as opposed to nearly 50 percent of individuals who reached an equivalent 
level in the secondary school system (that is, completed middle school without 
starting secondary school). Vocational education is more eff ective for integrat-
ing people into the formal sector than general education in Niamey, Dakar, 
Bamako, Cotonou, and Lomé. Th e share of workers with vocational training 
who work in the formal sector is 82 percent in Niamey, 71 percent in Dakar and 
Bamako, 58 percent in Cotonou, and 50 percent in Lomé. By way of comparison, 
the proportion of individuals who completed general studies at middle school 
and worked in the formal sector stood at 68 percent in Niamey, 55 percent in 
Dakar, 41 percent in Bamako, 44 percent in Cotonou, and 30 percent in Lomé. 
In Abidjan and Ouagadougou, vocational education shows no advantage over 
general education in terms of the chances of entering the formal sector.
Specifi cations of Earnings Functions 
Th e earnings regressions assess the seven cities separately. Th e estimates are 
obtained using the log of hourly rather than monthly earnings to take account of 
the heterogeneity of working hours in diff erent sectors. Th e additional explana-
tory variables in the models are migrant status (dummies for rural, urban, and 
foreign migrants); marital status (dummies for single, monogamous married, 
polygamous married, widowed, free union, divorced); and religion (dummies 
for Muslim and Christian). 
In most studies, log earnings are assumed to be linear or quadratic in years of 
education. Here we seek to document the shape of the entire earnings-education 
Table 5.1 Multinomial Logit Models of Impact of Education on Allocation of Labor to Public or Formal Private Sector in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Variable
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Public
Formal 
private Public
Formal 
private Public
Formal 
private Public
Formal 
private Public
Formal 
private Public
Formal 
private Public
Formal 
private
Years of education
0–6 (primaire) 0.266*** 0.165*** 0.259*** 0.102*** 0.305*** 0.183*** 0.328*** 0.190*** 0.265*** 0.204*** 0.267*** 0.195*** 0.320*** 0.215***
(3.36) (6.04) (5.65) (3.21) (4.98) (4.36) (8.32) (8.79) (4.44) (3.83) (7.31) (5.84) (8.80) (6.24)
7–9 (collège) 0.558*** 0.243*** 0.489*** 0.195*** 0.417*** 0.282*** 0.409*** 0.250*** 0.333*** 0.220*** 0.518*** 0.242*** 0.573*** 0.374***
(6.74) (5.63) (6.36) (2.92) (6.72) (5.59) (8.46) (7.01) (5.64) (4.16) (8.54) (4.07) (11.14) (6.87)
10–13 (lycée) 0.449*** 0.183** 0.593*** 0.445*** 0.335*** 0.327*** 0.365*** 0.235*** 0.525*** 0.382*** 0.343*** 0.331*** 0.383*** 0.265***
(4.51) (2.38) (6.54) (4.84) (3.98) (4.35) (5.09) (3.72) (6.46) (4.89) (4.05) (3.57) (4.62) (2.76)
13+ 0.402*** 0.326*** 0.179** 0.076 0.420*** 0.305*** 0.319*** 0.280*** 0.132** 0.070 0.158** 0.121* 0.159** 0.096
(4.70) (4.18) (2.28) (0.91) (7.03) (5.34) (4.67) (4.30) (2.10) (1.08) (2.39) (1.72) (2.33) (1.22)
Potential experience
Potential 
experience 
0.210*** 0.096*** 0.208*** 0.088*** 0.125*** 0.040** 0.169*** 0.077*** 0.148*** 0.068*** 0.100*** 0.056*** 0.155*** 0.139***
(6.14) (5.73) (8.84) (4.48) (5.45) (2.20) (8.14) (6.11) (5.67) (3.16) (5.24) (2.83) (7.75) (6.36)
(Potential 
experience)2/100
–0.297*** –0.129*** –0.244*** –0.132*** –0.129*** –0.038 –0.197*** –0.081*** –0.157*** –0.069* –0.109*** –0.092*** –0.169*** –0.179***
–(4.35) –(4.37) –(6.61) –(4.34) –(3.36) –(1.27) –(5.64) –(4.24) –(3.51) –(1.85) –(3.88) –(3.02) –(5.23) –(5.04)
Gender
Woman –0.701*** –1.058*** –0.536* –1.319*** –0.508*** –0.550*** –0.395** –0.768*** –0.743*** –1.010*** –0.299 –0.633*** –0.405** –0.541**
–(2.86) –(8.11) –(1.94) –(5.38) –(2.74) –(3.71) – (2.50) –(7.22) –(3.57) –(5.12) –(1.37) –(3.20) –(1.97) –(2.55)
Pseudo R 2 0.285 0.287 0.268 0.231 0.227 0.259 0.289
Number of 
observations 4,259 4,015 4,397 5,291 3,911 3,575 4,192
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire économique et 
statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics institutes.
Note: The base category is the informal sector. The additional explanatory variables are migrant status (dummies for rural, urban, or foreign migrants); marital status (dummies for single, 
monogamous married, polygamous married, widowed, free union, divorced); and dummies for religion (Muslim, Christian). Figures in parentheses are student statistics. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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profi le. We therefore adopt a more fl exible approach, specifying education as 
a piecewise linear spline function (see below) that allows the strength of the 
relationship between education and earnings to vary across diff erent parts of 
the educational distribution. We distinguish four levels of education: primary, 
lower secondary (collège), upper secondary (lycée), and tertiary. Th e education 
variables introduced have the form sk(e), where e is years of completed school-
ing at the k level (k: 1,…,4):
s e
e e
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Table 5.2 reports the pooled earnings functions estimates across sectors 
using Heckman’s two-step approach and endogenous education with the control 
function method. Th e use of a single model for all gainfully employed individu-
als provides only the average eff ect of education on earnings, masking specifi c 
education eff ects in each employment sector. Where diff erences in these eff ects 
across sectors are small, a pooled model is suffi  cient to be able to draw conclu-
sions about each labor market segment. Where these eff ects vary widely, the 
returns to education must be estimated separately for each sector. 
Tables 5.3–5.5 report the estimates corrected for potential endogenous sector 
selection (using Lee’s method).14 To ease reading, given the number of coun-
tries studied and the set of alternative estimation techniques, we also present a 
synthesis table (table 5.6) reporting the average marginal returns to schooling 
using diff erent methods.15 Before turning to the comments on the returns to 
human capital, we briefl y discuss the results obtained with diff erent estimation 
strategies.16
Ordinary least squares versus selectivity-corrected earnings functions. Using 
a pooled population of paid-work participants across the three sectors, the 
selection-correction terms stemming from a probit equation of paid-work 
 participation in the fi rst stage are generally insignifi cant, except in Abidjan 
at the 1 percent level (this fi nding means that the mechanism of allocation 
of paid-work participants versus nonparticipants is not random and aff ects 
earnings signifi cantly). Paid-work participation is associated with unobserved 
 characteristics that are negatively correlated with earnings. If sample selectiv-
ity is not accounted for, ordinary least squares estimates would yield biased 
estimates of the returns to observed characteristics, notably human capital. 
Table 5.2 Earnings Functions with Endogenous Education and Selectivity Correction in All Sectors in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(dependent variable: log of hourly earnings)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Years of education
0–6 (primaire) 0.037*** 0.058*** 0.080*** 0.092*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.103***
(3.44) (5.34) (9.24) (9.00) (4.82) (4.23) (9.66)
7–9 (collège) 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.077*** 0.106*** 0.102*** 0.158*** 0.182***
(6.92) (4.78) (5.42) (6.92) (5.80) (7.44) (11.55)
10–13 (lycée) 0.187*** 0.171*** 0.174*** 0.134*** 0.215*** 0.182*** 0.201***
(7.62) (6.13) (7.98) (5.85) (8.41) (6.21) (8.76)
13+ (higher education) 0.166*** 0.138*** 0.141*** 0.166*** 0.154*** 0.103*** 0.157***
(7.99) (6.44) (8.46) (8.80) (4.90) (6.23) (8.42)
Experience
Potential experience 0.014** 0.029*** 0.011* 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.044***
(2.31) (5.10) (1.78) (5.65) (3.80) (4.47) (7.73)
Potential experience squared/100 –0.002 –0.036*** –0.008 –0.040*** –0.030*** –0.030*** –0.052***
(0.22) (4.33) (0.81) (4.59) (2.79) (3.44) (6.34)
Seniority in current job 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.030***
(4.76) (5.03) (4.87) (5.65) (5.76) (5.60) (5.82)
Seniority in current job squared/100 –0.058*** –0.033** –0.040** –0.041*** –0.053*** –0.047*** –0.040**
(2.94) (2.23) (2.43) (2.96) (2.83) (2.88) (2.49)
Gender
Woman –0.325*** –0.190*** –0.330*** –0.264*** –0.229*** –0.249*** –0.210***
(7.48) (3.49) (8.92) (6.69) (4.42) (4.81) (5.20)
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Sector
Public sector 0.675*** 0.281*** 0.383*** 0.469*** 0.610*** 0.420*** 0.640***
(14.24) (5.75) (9.13) (11.14) (10.99) (9.41) (15.83)
Formal private sector 0.476*** 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.407*** 0.418*** 0.397*** 0.591***
(15.03) (4.59) (5.64) (11.83) (7.39) (8.49) (13.16)
Corrections
Control variable (residuals of education regression) –0.007 –0.030*** –0.028*** –0.037*** –0.023* –0.015 –0.038***
(0.74) (3.70) (3.81) (4.02) (1.90) (1.60) (4.79)
Inverse Mills ratio –0.240*** 0.058 –0.092 0.004 –0.026 0.035 0.055
(3.86) (1.06) (1.49) (0.07) (0.36) (0.58) (1.03)
Constant –2.023*** –2.480*** –2.296*** –2.506*** –2.967*** –2.759*** –3.214***
(19.41) (23.18) (21.30) (20.02) (24.76) (20.51) (28.63)
Number of observations 4,011 3,821 4,184 4,364 3,496 3,069 3,665
Pseudo R 2 0.51 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.38 0.46 0.55
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migrant status (dummies for rural, urban, and foreign migrants); marital status (dummies for single, monogamous 
married, polygamous married, widowed, free union, divorced); and religion (dummies for Muslim and Christian). The inverse Mills ratio is derived from a probit estimation of labor 
market participation for each city (with a dummy variable of strictly positive earnings as the dependent variable) comprising age and its square, gender, years of education, migrant 
status, marital status, religion, and one identifying variable (the dependency ratio). The reference category is a man working in the informal sector. Figures in parentheses are 
 student statistics. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent, *** level significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 5.3 Earnings Functions with Endogenous Education and Selectivity Correction in the Public Sector in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(dependent variable: log of hourly earnings)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Years of education
0–6 (primaire) 0.090** 0.085** 0.063 0.069* –0.016 0.031 0.095***
(1.97) (2.32) (1.44) (1.72) (0.21) (1.10) (3.08)
7–9 (collège) –0.048 0.131*** 0.125** 0.034 –0.024 0.127*** 0.139***
(0.81) (2.58) (2.28)v (0.74) (0.35) (3.42) (3.51)
10–13 (lycée) 0.138** 0.157*** 0.182*** 0.112** 0.094 0.148*** 0.141***
(2.43) (3.50) (3.56) (2.41) (1.21) (3.91) (3.86)
13+ (higher education) 0.099*** 0.135*** 0.141*** 0.127*** 0.075* 0.094*** 0.124***
(2.80) (5.33) (3.76) (3.89) (1.82) (4.37) (5.75)
Experience
Potential experience –0.012 0.069*** 0.041 0.015 –0.022 0.058*** 0.058***
(0.45) (3.59) (1.33) (0.59) (0.62) (5.36) (3.50)
Potential experience 
squared/100
0.064 –0.091*** –0.017 0.007 0.062 –0.078*** –0.063**
(1.25) (2.76) (0.31) (0.18) (1.04) (4.39) (2.25)
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Gender
Woman –0.017 –0.072 –0.003 –0.105 0.281* –0.081 –0.058
(0.20) (1.07) (0.03) (1.19) (1.88) (1.37) (0.97)
Corrections
Control variable (residuals 
of education regression)
–0.006 –0.015 –0.008 –0.015 0.033 0.011 –0.007
(0.26) (1.04) (0.51) (0.97) (1.13) (0.86) (0.59)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.493** –0.184 –0.100 0.249 0.711* 0.016 0.003
(2.42) (1.03) (0.29) (0.92) (1.88) (0.12) (0.01)
Constant –0.176 –3.235*** –2.679** –1.089 0.253 –2.427*** –2.716***
(0.21) (4.77) (2.00) (1.09) (0.18) (5.79) (3.95)
Number of observations 306 459 411 483 313 597 595
Pseudo R 2 0.44 0.38 0.46 0.38 0.45 0.47 0.53
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migrant status, marital status, and religion. The Lee ratio is derived from a multinomial logit model of sector 
choices (with, as reference category, nonpaid work participation) comprising age and its square, gender, years of education, migrant status, marital status, religion, and 
identifying variables (namely, dummies on the individual’s relationship to the head of household and the dependency ratio). Figures in parentheses are student statistics. 
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 5.4 Earnings Functions with Endogenous Education and Selectivity Correction in the Formal Private Sector in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(dependent variable: log of hourly earning)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Years of education
0–6 (primaire) 0.040* 0.101*** 0.057 0.084*** 0.070 0.094*** 0.127***
(1.72) (2.88) (1.57) (3.58) (1.17) (2.61) (3.86)
7–9 (collège) 0.116*** 0.184*** 0.139*** 0.089*** 0.050 0.182*** 0.114***
(4.32) (3.38) (3.93) (3.39) (0.91) (3.51) (2.66)
10–13 (lycée) 0.218*** 0.113 0.124** 0.141*** 0.260*** 0.171** 0.247***
(5.84) (1.45) (2.54) (4.18) (3.55) (2.52) (4.79)
13+ (higher education) 0.214*** 0.261*** 0.175*** 0.169*** 0.184*** 0.115** 0.205***
(6.83) (5.44) (6.06) (5.94) (3.17) (2.41) (3.66)
Experience
Potential experience 0.040*** 0.020 0.019 0.032** 0.041* 0.053*** 0.042**
(3.26) (0.98) (1.51) (2.39) (1.76) (3.05) (1.97)
Potential experience 
squared/100
–0.027 0.012 0.011 –0.022 –0.026 –0.045 –0.036
(1.26) (0.34) (0.50) (1.04) (0.62) (1.48) (1.06)
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Gender
Woman –0.083 0.036 –0.039 –0.058 0.031 –0.422** –0.016
0.040* 0.101*** 0.057 0.084*** 0.070 0.094*** 0.127***
Corrections
Control variable (residuals 
of education regression)
–0.008 –0.068*** –0.021 –0.029* 0.015 0.009 –0.042**
(0.53) (2.98) (1.31) (1.88) (0.39) (0.39) (2.07)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.070 0.345 –0.093 0.203 –0.122 –0.328 0.050
(0.62) (1.18) (0.56) (1.04) (0.44) (1.38) (0.21)
Constant –1.930*** –2.081*** –2.362*** –1.778*** –3.186*** –3.491*** –2.708***
(5.77) (3.02) (4.64) (3.39) (3.75) (5.48) (3.30)
Number of observations 854 455 529 957 307 414 346
Pseudo R 2 0.46 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.46 0.48
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migrant status, marital status, and religion. The Lee ratio is derived from a multinomial logit model of sector 
choices (with nonpaid work participation as the reference category) comprising age and its square, gender, years of education, migrant status, marital status, religion, and iden-
tifying variables (namely, dummies on the individual’s relationship to the head of household and the dependency ratio). Figures in parentheses are student statistics. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 5.5 Earnings Functions with Endogenous Education and Selectivity Correction in the Informal Sector in Seven Cities in West Africa, 
2001/02
(dependent variable: log of hourly earnings)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Years of education
0–6 (primaire) 0.029* 0.050*** 0.081*** 0.090*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.093***
(1.88) (3.92) (7.66) (7.26) (3.96) (3.36) (6.26)
7–9 (collège) 0.122*** 0.067** 0.073*** 0.093*** 0.110*** 0.138*** 0.167***
(4.64) (2.55) (4.54) (3.99) (5.49) (4.07) (6.67)
10–13 (lycée) 0.122*** 0.184*** 0.205*** 0.130*** 0.196*** 0.208*** 0.231***
(2.74) (3.75) (5.43) (2.88) (5.13) (3.44) (4.63)
13+ (higher education) 0.225*** 0.036 0.144*** 0.151** 0.144** 0.141** 0.194***
(4.10) (0.49) (3.40) (2.31) (2.39) (2.44) (3.54)
Experience
Potential experience 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.012* 0.044*** 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.046***
(3.00) (5.32) (1.93) (7.78) (4.80) (3.15) (7.47)
Potential experience 
squared/100
–0.011 –0.034*** –0.008 –0.051*** –0.031*** –0.015 –0.048***
(1.01) (4.24) (0.89) (6.43) (3.24) (1.49) (5.69)
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Gender
Woman –0.491*** –0.254*** –0.442*** –0.320*** –0.331*** –0.269*** –0.310***
(8.57) (4.34) (10.09) (7.82) (5.86) (4.27) (5.49)
Corrections
Control variable (residuals 
of education regression)
0.006 –0.020* –0.031*** –0.033*** –0.027** –0.029* –0.032**
(0.39) (1.74) (3.43) (2.67) (2.01) (1.80) (2.38)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.233*** –0.062 0.125* –0.018 0.047 0.054 –0.049
(3.08) (1.06) (1.77) (0.29) (0.59) (0.78) (0.72)
Constant –1.778*** –2.256*** –2.101*** –2.386*** –2.811*** –2.483*** –2.995***
(13.61) (17.81) (17.60) (19.14) (20.07) (13.96) (21.99)
Number of observations 2,859 2,929 3,250 3,423 2,930 2,233 2,771
Pseudo R 2 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.31
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migrant status; marital status; the individual’s relationship to the head of household (dummies for head of house-
hold, spouse, son/daughter, father/mother, other relatives); and religion. The Lee ratio is derived from a multinomial logit model of sector choices (with nonpaid work participa-
tion as the reference category) comprising age and its square, gender, years of education, migrant status, marital status, the individual’s relationship to the head of household, 
religion, and one identifying variable (namely, the dependency ratio). Figures in parentheses are student statistics. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent, *** level significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 5.6 Marginal Returns to Education in Seven Cities in West Africa, Using Alternative Estimation Techniques, 2001/02
Sector Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
All sectors
Ordinary least squares 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.069***
Selectivity corrected (Lee’s method) 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.070***
Selectivity corrected + father’s characteristics 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.065***
Selectivity corrected + control function 0.037*** 0.058*** 0.080*** 0.092*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.103***
Number of observations 4,011 3,821 4,184 4,364 3,496 3,069 3,665
Public sector
Ordinary least squares 0.206*** 0.114*** 0.163*** 0.118*** 0.245*** 0.142*** 0.136***
Selectivity corrected (Lee’s method) 0.133** 0.145*** 0.175*** 0.094** 0.129* 0.140*** 0.136***
Selectivity corrected + father’s characteristics 0.144*** 0.154*** 0.178*** 0.093** 0.120* 0.139*** 0.137***
Selectivity corrected + control function 0.138** 0.157*** 0.182*** 0.112** 0.094 0.127*** 0.141***
Number of observations 306 459 411 483 313 597 595
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Formal private sector
Ordinary least squares 0.112*** 0.143*** 0.104** 0.077*** 0.056 0.181*** 0.075**
Selectivity corrected (Lee’s method) 0.108*** 0.138*** 0.111** 0.065*** 0.063 0.191*** 0.065*
Selectivity corrected + father’s characteristics 0.107*** 0.115** 0.099** 0.063*** 0.064 0.195*** 0.069*
Selectivity corrected + control function 0.116*** 0.184*** 0.124*** 0.089*** 0.050 0.182*** 0.114***
Number of observations 854 455 529 957 307 414 346
Informal sector
Ordinary least squares 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.067***
Selectivity corrected (Lee’s method) 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.066***
Selectivity corrected + father’s characteristics 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.061***
Selectivity corrected + control function 0.029* 0.050*** 0.081*** 0.090*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.093***
Number of observations 2,859 2,931 3,250 3,423 2,930 2,233 2,771
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: Earnings functions include the set of characteristics reported in tables 5.3–5.5. Estimates are computed at the sample mean using the piecewise linear spline earnings function 
in tables 5.2–5.5. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Th e same picture emerges from the sectoral estimates, which also report only 
a few signifi cant selectivity terms (Abidjan and Lomé for the public sector, 
 Cotonou and Abidjan for the informal sector; see tables 5.3–5.5). 
Exogenous versus endogenous education. We use the father’s characteristics 
as instruments by means of the control function method. Using the fi rst-stage 
regressions, in which education is regressed on all exogenous variables, we test 
for the joint signifi cance of the coeffi  cients of father’s characteristics, a necessary 
condition for consistency of the estimates. For all cities, we can safely reject the 
hypothesis that these coeffi  cients are jointly zero.17  Several interesting patterns 
emerge from the control function estimates of the returns to schooling (see 
tables 5.2–5.5).
Using the control function approach, we can directly identify the correlation 
between the endogenous variable (education) and its unobserved determinants. 
A signifi cant parameter estimate of the control variable (residuals of the educa-
tion regression) means that the unexplained variation in the education variable 
also aff ects variation in earnings. An insignifi cant parameter means that we 
cannot accept the hypothesis of endogeneity. Table 5.7 presents the p-values 
for t-tests associated with each control variable in the diff erent specifi cations.
For all cities, we cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of education in 
the public sector.18 By contrast, we reject exogeneity in the informal sector in 
all cities except Abidjan. In the formal private sector, we obtain mixed results, 
rejecting exogeneity in Bamako, Dakar, and Ouagadougou (instrumentation for 
the private sector in Bamako appeared dubious, however). In Abidjan, the unex-
plained variation of schooling never signifi cantly aff ects variation in earnings. 
When exogeneity of education is rejected, we place more confi dence in the 
instrumental variables estimates, at least the ones based on the control function 
Table 5.7  Endogeneity Tests of Education in the Earnings Functions in Seven Cities 
in West Africa, by Sector, 2001/02
City All sectors Public sector Formal private sector Informal sector
Abidjan 0.46 0.80 0.60 0.69
Bamako 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.08
Cotonou 0.00 0.61 0.19 0.00
Dakar 0.00 0.33 0.06 0.01
Lomé 0.06 0.26 0.70 0.04
Niamey 0.11 0.39 0.70 0.07
Ouagadougou 0.00 0.56 0.04 0.02
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: The null hypothesis is that education is exogenous in the earnings function. Figures show p-values of 
the t-test.
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approach. Motivations for this choice can be found in Kuépié, Nordman, and 
Roubaud (2009).
Cross-Country Comparison
Chow tests for the joint equality of coeffi  cients across sectors show that the 
decomposition by institutional sector is justifi ed. Indeed, we fi nd highly con-
trasting confi gurations. As expected, the models’ explanatory power declines as 
one moves from the public sector (pseudo R2 = 0.44 to the formal private sector 
[0.39] and the informal sector [0.23]). Th is hierarchy is consistent with the pre-
dictions of the standard human capital model, which is better suited to account-
ing for the heterogeneity of earnings in the public sector, where wages are based 
on a set scale that takes education and experience explicitly into account. In 
the informal sector, apart from the probability of greater measurement errors, 
factors not taken into account in our equation, such as the amount of physical 
capital, are likely to have a signifi cant impact on earnings.
To synthesize the results for education, we present histograms of the mar-
ginal returns to education by sector and city at the sample means of education 
(fi gure 5.1). In six out of seven cities, the return to education is highest in the 
public sector, with a marginal return ranging from 9.4 percent (in Dakar) to 
17.5 percent (in Cotonou). Th is fi nding refl ects, to a great extent, the salary 
scales for civil servants, which are determined based on diploma and length 
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
Note: Returns are calculated at the sample mean. Estimates are based on results reported in table 5.6. Returns are 
for the exogenous education variable for the public sector of all cities and for the private sectors of Abidjan and 
Bamako.
Figure 5.1 Marginal Returns to Education in Seven Cities in West Africa, by Sector, 2001/02
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of service. Th e formal private sector comes next (except in Niamey, where it 
ranked fi rst), followed by the informal sector (except in Lomé, where returns to 
education are higher in the informal sector [6 percent] than in the formal pri-
vate sector [5 percent], and in Dakar, where the marginal returns across sectors 
are roughly the same in the two sectors). 
Convexity of returns. Th e results show strong evidence that earnings are non-
linear in education, with a convex profi le. For all the regressions reported in 
tables 5.3–5.6, we can reject the linear model at the 10 percent level or lower.19 
Convex marginal returns mean that education has a growing impact on remu-
neration. In almost all cases, a completed year of lycée (10–13 years completed) 
provides a greater return than a year of collège (7–9 years), especially in the 
private sectors. 
In fi gure 5.2, we present predicted earnings in each sector based on years of 
completed schooling. For all sectors, earnings are roughly constant until about 
the 8th year of education and sharply increase around the 11th year, with small 
diff erences across cities. Th is rise in earnings occurs slightly earlier for informal 
sector workers (about the eighth year of schooling). Th ese patterns indicate that, 
to a large extent, the convex profi le refl ects the surge in income observed when 
individuals make the transition from secondary to higher education in the for-
mal sectors and the completion of collège in the informal sector. 
Th ese results are inconsistent with the traditional model of human capital 
accumulation, in which the marginal return to education is assumed to be con-
stant or decreasing. Schultz (2004) highlights this convexity, using household 
surveys for six African countries (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, and South Africa); Söderbom and others (2006) observe it in samples 
of employees of manufacturing fi rms in Kenya and Tanzania. To our knowledge, 
this feature of Africa’s labor markets has not been documented before at the 
sectoral level using representative samples from urban Africa. 
Th is result is important, because it has been advocated that not accounting 
for the high proportion of workers in the informal sector may lead to overes-
timates of the returns to primary education and underestimates of the returns 
to higher education (Bennell 1996). Convexity is revealed here in all sectors, 
including the informal sector. In our estimates, the marginal return to pri-
mary education is lower than the returns to secondary and higher education in 
all sectors, and the return to primary school is lower in the informal sector 
(6.6 percent) than in the formal private sector (7.2 percent). Similarly, the aver-
age return to a year of lycée is higher in the informal sector (18.3 percent) than 
in the formal (public and private) sector (on average, 15.5 percent). Hence, not 
accounting for earnings in the informal sector indeed yields an overestimation 
of the returns to primary education, as Bennell (1996) predicted, as well as pos-
sibly an underestimation of returns to higher levels of education.20
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Figure 5.2 Estimated Hourly Earnings in Seven Cities in West Africa, by Sector, 2001/02
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Figure 5.2 (continued)
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Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 5.1 for details).
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Observing increasing returns to education by levels is important, because 
the idea that primary education is an eff ective instrument for fi ghting poverty 
is based partly on the hypothesis of a concave earnings function—that is, the 
notion that investing in education is more profi table during the fi rst years of 
schooling. Recommendations for policies aimed at promoting primary educa-
tion in Sub-Saharan Africa were drawn up on the basis of this premise, among 
others (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004). 
Various arguments have been posited to explain convexity in the returns to 
schooling (Bennell 1996, 2002; Schultz 2004). One is that primary education 
has been overexpanded, reducing the returns relative to higher levels. Another 
is that over time the quality of primary school has declined, reducing returns 
(Behrman, Ross, and Sabot 2008). Th e slowdown in formal sector growth, 
which may have reduced the demand for educated labor and perhaps aff ected 
less educated individuals more strongly, has also been mentioned. 
Returns to Qualifi cations
Th e fact that the earnings function is convex prompted us to make more detailed 
analyses, measuring the returns to diff erent levels of qualifi cation and not just to 
average years. To do so, we estimated the marginal returns to holding a diploma, 
thus accounting for the quality of the school career. In the private sector, we 
controlled for the endogeneity of schooling using the control function method 
(except in Abidjan and Bamako). 
Returns to qualifi cations can be studied in at least two ways. One way is to 
directly consider the regression model coeffi  cients. In this case, the coeffi  cient 
associated with each qualifi cation dummy is interpreted as the rate of increase 
in earnings between individuals with no qualifi cations (the reference) and indi-
viduals with a particular qualifi cation. Another way is to calculate the marginal 
returns obtained by subtracting from the considered qualifi cation’s coeffi  cient 
(qualifi cation d) the value of the coeffi  cient for the qualifi cation immediately 
below it (qualifi cation d – 1). For example, the marginal return to a baccalauréat 
plus two years of higher education (BAC+2) is the diff erence between the coef-
fi cient for the BAC+2 and the coeffi  cient for the baccalauréat alone. Th e return 
to a primary certifi cate (Certifi cat d’études primaires [CEP]) is the diff erence in 
average earnings between someone with a CEP and someone with no diploma, 
the return to the middle school certifi cate (Brevet d’études du premier cycle du 
second degré [BEPC]) is the diff erence in average earnings between someone 
with a BEPC and someone with a CEP, and so forth. Marginal returns hence 
correspond to the increases in earnings generated by the acquisition of the next 
level of qualifi cations. In this study, we rely on marginal returns, because they 
measure the additional value of each qualifi cation rather than the value com-
pared with “no qualifi cations” which is almost always positive. 
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Kuépié, Nordman, and Roubaud (2009) report the results of this exercise 
using histograms of the marginal returns to various qualifi cations for each sec-
tor. Not surprisingly, the eff ect of each qualifi cation on earnings is positive over-
all, with a huge quantitative leap for secondary and higher education, as already 
shown using continuous variables for schooling. Th e most striking result is that, 
depending on the city, some diplomas (such as the baccalauréat) do not yield 
positive marginal returns. Th is situation refl ects either the inadequacy of the 
training considered with respect to the labor market or the fact that certain 
diplomas have no value in the labor market but are aimed solely at provid-
ing access to higher levels of education. Th is hypothesis might explain the low 
marginal profi tability of some diplomas in the public sector. But the fact that 
for many diplomas, additional earnings are nil or negative in the formal private 
sector suggests that many training schemes do not correspond to the needs of 
the labor market in this sector.
Th is lack of connection between the level of training revealed by a diploma 
and the remuneration obtained in the formal private labor market is evident in 
all of the cities studied. Marginal earnings seem to correspond more closely to 
the level of training in the informal sector than in the formal private sector (but 
less than in the public sector). Th is result is inconsistent with the idea that the 
informal sector does not value educational capital. Th e profi tability of education 
in the informal sector is illustrated by the earnings premium received by indi-
viduals with vocational diplomas (in particular the Brevet d’études profession-
nelles [BEP]). In fact, returns to vocational training in the informal sector oft en 
exceed returns in the formal private sector. Vocational education qualifi cations 
are also oft en more profi table than general education qualifi cations, which take 
longer to obtain. For example, although it generally takes one year less to obtain 
a BEP (on average 11.6 years) than to obtain the baccalauréat (on average 13.0 
years), the BEP is oft en more profi table than the baccalauréat, especially in the 
informal sector. Th e returns to the BEP are more than 40 percent higher than 
the returns to the baccalauréat in the formal private sector of Cotonou and in 
the informal sectors of Ouagadougou, Bamako, Niamey, and Lomé. Th e same 
result holds if we compare the premium for obtaining the CAP (a vocational 
certifi cate equivalent to completed primary school) versus the BEPC (a general 
certifi cate of completed primary education).
Conclusion
Using a series of comparable labor force surveys in urban West Africa, we esti-
mate the impact of education on labor market outcomes among representative 
samples of workers in seven economic capitals. Th e data provide a unique cross-
country comparison using the same variables and methodology for each city.
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We tackle two recurrent econometric issues that arise in assessing the eff ect 
of education on individual earnings. First, we address the issue of endogenous 
sector allocation (public, formal private, and informal sectors) in the earn-
ings functions estimates and provide evidence that correcting for this sample 
selectivity refi nes the returns to education in all cities and sectors. Second, for 
most cities, we reject the assumption of exogeneity of the education variable, 
except in the public sector. Using the workers’ family background as an instru-
ment for education, we fi nd that the returns to schooling usually increase once 
endogeneity is accounted for. Th is eff ect is particularly strong in the informal 
sector. 
Traditional theories assume constant or concave marginal returns to educa-
tion, which ensure immediate, high profi tability from the fi rst years of school-
ing. Th e data from the 1-2-3 surveys of West Africa reveal convex returns 
in all sectors, including the informal sector. Th is fi nding casts doubts on the 
suitability of estimating average marginal returns and calls for disaggregated 
estimates at each level of the educational path. We provide evidence that the 
convex profi le refl ects the surge in income observed when individuals make 
the transition from secondary to higher education in the formal sectors; for 
informal sector workers, it mainly refl ects completion of the fi rst secondary 
cycle. In Abidjan, Bamako, Dakar, and Lomé, the earnings-education profi le 
observed is particularly convex for young workers, especially in the informal 
sector. 
Even at high levels, education substantially increases earnings in informal 
sector jobs in most of the cities studied.21 To our knowledge, these features of 
Africa’s labor markets have never before been documented at the sectoral level 
using representative samples of urban areas. 
Convexity of the returns to schooling means that stimulating access to pri-
mary education is eff ective in reducing poverty only if primary school graduates 
can continue their studies in order to take full advantage of the high marginal 
returns associated with many years of education. Management of the fl ows of 
students completing general secondary and higher education could benefi t from 
an in-depth review of the (too) general content of schooling programs, with an 
eye toward adapting it to the needs of the labor market. In the meantime, to 
increase the returns to low levels of schooling, improving primary school qual-
ity should remain at the top of any agenda for education. 
Th at said, unemployment is growing in West African cities, especially 
among educated workers. Th is mismatch between (increasing) investment in 
schooling and actual labor market opportunities represents a major challenge. 
Would an increase in education generate its own demand? Or would more 
educated people simply add to the pool of disenfranchised and disillusioned 
workers, whose only hope is to migrate and fi nd employment elsewhere? If 
our fi ndings provide insight into the question of where specifi c bottlenecks 
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arise on the labor demand side, they also provide evidence of the existence of 
signifi cant returns to education in the informal sector that may counterbalance 
the incentive for job queuing. More specifi cally, if schooling helps workers in 
the informal sector be more productive (probably thanks to innovation and 
adaptability), then household and government investments in their education 
are not being made in vain. Given that the informal sector has created more 
than 80 percent of urban jobs in West Africa in recent years, concentrating 
public investments in employment in this sector with attractive policies for 
the most qualifi ed people could represent a serious alternative to the lack of 
employment observed in the formal sectors, at least in the short term. Coupled 
with continued support to primary school quality and postprimary education, 
such a policy could also pay off  in the medium to long term by generating the 
human capital accumulation required for the modern economy to take off  in 
African cities. 
Notes
 1. By way of comparison, analyses of the internal effi  ciency of education systems con-
cern school processes and the way the teaching establishments operate: generally 
speaking, they compare the schools’ activities and organizational methods with the 
results obtained by pupils while they are still in the system, looking for the most 
cost-eff ective situations (Mingat and Suchaut 2000). 
 2. See Kuépié, Nordman, and Roubaud (2009) for further development of this point 
and for additional or more complete analyses of the fi ndings presented in this 
chapter. 
 3. Th e cities are Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire; Bamako, Mali; Cotonou, Benin; Dakar, Senegal; 
Lomé, Togo; Niamey, Niger; and Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Although Abidjan 
and Cotonou are not administrative capitals, we refer to them as capitals because 
they are the most important economic centers in their countries (Cotonou is also 
the seat of government).
 4. For a description of the 1-2-3 surveys, see box O.1 in the overview.
 5. For a presentation of descriptive statistics (education, earnings, and so forth), see 
chapter 1.
 6. Based on Monte Carlo simulations, Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007) 
conclude that Lee’s method is adapted to small samples. 
 7. Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007, p. 192) argue that correcting for selec-
tion bias based on the multinomial logit model is a “reasonable alternative to mul-
tinomial normal models when the focus is on estimating an outcome over selected 
populations rather than on estimating the selection process itself. Th is seems true 
even when the IIA hypothesis is severely at odds.” As we are interested primarily 
in results in the second-stage regression, this argument allows us to be confi dent 
regarding the choice of a multinomial logit.
 8. Th e results of the probits and multinomial logits are not reported, in order to save 
space. Th ey are available on request from the authors.
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 9. Th e exceptions were the formal private sectors in Niamey and Dakar, where the 
appropriateness of the excluding conditions in the second stage was rejected (at the 
10 percent level in Niamey and the 1 percent level in Dakar). In these two cases, 
we then tried to restrict the number of exclusions, using as identifying variables 
only a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was the household head 
(together with the dependency ratio). Th e test was satisfi ed, and the results in the 
second step did not diff er from the results obtained previously. We hence report the 
results including the full set of exclusions in order to ensure perfect comparability 
across countries. For all cities and sectors, Wald tests of joint signifi cance of the 
instruments in the fi rst stage never rejected the null hypothesis at the 1 percent 
level. Th e second-stage equation is still identifi ed without excluding conditions for 
the need of the tests, as identifi cation relies on the distributional assumption of Lee’s 
model (see Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand 2007).
 10. For example, Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997) use parental education, Butcher 
and Case (1994) exploit the presence of any sister within the family, and Card (1995) 
draws on proximity to a four-year college as instruments.
 11. Th ese fi gures are slightly diff erent from the fi gures presented in chapter 1 because of 
changes in education brackets.
 12. Th ese fi ndings are available from the authors upon request.
 13. Th e same set of control variables used for the analysis of unemployment is used here. 
 14. We drop the tenure variable from the set of covariates in the sectoral estimates, 
because seniority in the current job makes less sense in the informal sector. 
 15. Assuming that the marginal return to education varies across educational levels but 
is constant within each cycle, the marginal return to education around the sample’s 
education mean is defi ned as follows:
  R I(= ∈
=
∑ak
k
keduc C
1
4
),  where αk is the estimated coeffi  cients of the k education 
  variables corresponding to the four cycles, I(.) is the indicator function, educ is the 
average years of schooling, and C is the educational group.
 16. Interested readers should see Kuépié, Nordman, and Roubaud (2009).
 17. In 18 out of 21 cases, Sargan tests on overidentifying restrictions cannot reject at 
the 10 percent level the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Th e three 
cases where validity is not supported are the formal private and informal sectors 
of Bamako and the public sector of Niamey, suggesting that uncorrected education 
returns be considered in these cases. Th e results of these tests are available upon 
request.
 18. Tests for exogeneity based on Hausman tests confi rm these fi ndings.
 19. We investigated whether our fi ndings are sensitive to functional form by consider-
ing the eff ects of modeling the earnings-education profi le as second- and third-order 
polynomials. Th e quadratic function systematically produced signifi cant squared edu-
cation coeffi  cients; the cubic form appeared less appropriate in the majority of cases. 
 20. Th ese cross-country averages mask some country specifi cities.
 21. Th e heterogeneity of the informal sector in this respect, notably the possible coex-
istence of diff erent employment segments with specifi c features, deserves consider-
ation (see chapter 4). 
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